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After making due allowance for capital flight, the splurge in government 
consumption,  and  inefficient  investments  by  the  parastatal  sector,  it  is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that Mexico obtained remarkably little for 
the $59.7 billion of foreign loans taken out during the Lopez Portillo years. 
Perhaps the best evidence in support of  this conclusion is provided by  the 
extreme hardship the economy has  subsequently suffered in  servicing the 
debt. This is the topic of the next chapter. 
5  The De La Madrid 
Administration and 
the Present Crisis 
The  De  La  Madrid  administration  began  with  a  two-year  respite  from 
large-scale debt service payments. On 10 December 1982, an agreement was 
reached  with  the  commercial  banks  to  reschedule  $23  billion  of  capital 
payments on the public sector debt coming due between 23 August 1982 and 
31 December 1984. The maturity of the debt was extended to eight years and 
allowed  for  a  four-year  grace  period.  The  price  for  lengthening  the 
repayment period was a  1 percent restructuring fee and  an increase in the 
interest rate of  approximately one percentage point. Whereas the previously 
contracted debt involved spreads of 0.83 and 0.66 percentage points over the 
U.S.  prime rate and LIBOR, respectively, the restructured debt gave lenders 
the  option of  a rate  1.75 percentage points over the prime rate  or  1.875 
percentage  points  over  LIBOR.  The  new  (public  sector)  debt  service 
schedule involved  minimal  amortization  until  the  end  of  1984 and  then 
called for $61.4 billion of capital payments from 1985 to 1990. 
The debt restructuring at the end of  1982 was followed in  1983 by  two 
additional,  smaller  reschedulings.  Private  firms  able  to  convert  their 
short-term  debt  into  long-term  debt  according  to  government  guidelines 
became  eligible  for  a  program  of  insurance  against  exchange  rate  risk 
(covering both  principal and  interest) offered by  FICORCA  (see sec.  8.3 
below  for a detailed description of  the program).  By  the end of  October, 
some $12 billion of private sector liabilities were tentatively covered by the 
FICORCA facility; almost all of this debt was renegotiated to mature at eight 
or more years and  included  a four-year grace period.  Earlier, in June,  $2 
billion in export credits had also been rescheduled. 
These reschedulings were supplemented by $5 billion in new loans to the 
public sector: The new loans carried even harder terms than the restructured 448  Edward F.  Buffie 
debt: for a six-year loan with a three-year grace period, a 1.25 percent com- 
mitment  fee  was  charged  and  the  interest rate  was  fixed  at  either  (ac- 
cording to the lender's choice) 2.125 points over the U.S. prime rate or 2.25 
points over LIBOR. 
During the same period in which the restructuring of the external debt was 
negotiated, a wide-ranging stabilization-cum-structural  reform program was 
agreed  upon  with  the  IMF.  Sizable  increases  in  the  value-added  tax, 
upper-bracket income  tax  rates,  and  public  enterprise prices were  to  be 
combined with large expenditure cuts in an ambitious attempt to lower the 
public sector budget deficit to 8.5 percent of  GDP in  1983. As in 1970 and 
1976, along with fiscal retrenchment came trade liberalization and a whole 
host  of  measures aimed at reform of  the financial system. Growth in  the 
monetary base was to be limited to the rate consistent with the target for the 
fiscal deficit, and nominal interest rates were increased sharply in an effort to 
raise real rates and promote financial intermediation. The prevailing system 
of exchange controls was replaced by a dual exchange system in which most 
merchandise imports and all merchandise exports and debt payments were 
carried out at a controlled rate, while all other transactions took place at a 
higher, free market rate. The controlled rate was adjusted by  a daily crawl 
and initially set at a value above that judged to be the equilibrium purchasing 
power parity (PPP) rate. Trade liberalization consisted of  replacing import 
licenses by  tariffs,  rationalization of  the  tariff  structure,  and  a  gradual 
reduction in the overall level of protection. 
Contrary to widespread expectations, fiscal discipline was rigidly enforced 
and the ambitious goal of  halving the public sector deficit relative to GDP 
was attained (table 5.1). The consolidated deficit declined from 17.6 to 8.9 
percent, with the public  sector's expenditure share falling and  its revenue 
'hble 5.1  Public Sector Revenues and Expenditures (% of GNP) 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986P 
Expenditure 
Current 




















































Sources: Data for 1982-85  are from SHCP. The 1986 figure for capital expenditure is from Informe And. 
All other data for 1986 are from Indicudores Economicos (Bank of Mexico). Current expenditure is calculated 
residually by subtracting capital expenditure from total expenditure. 
PReliminary figures. 
There is an inexplicable  discrepancy of 474.2 billion pesos between the revenue and expenditure calculation 
of  the deficit and the sources of  funds measure of the economic deficit. 
bDeficit of  La Banca de Desarrollo. 449  MexicoIChapter 5 
share increasing by four percentage points apiece. It is important to observe, 
however, that the adjustment in both revenues and expenditures was highly 
uneven. As is clear from the breakdown of the deficit in table 5.2 and from 
table 5.3, greater revenue generation of PEMEX through higher internal and 
external sales accounted for over 100 percent of the increase in total public 
sector income; the revenue share of the non-PEMEX public sector actually 
fell (relative to GDP) by  1.7 percentage points due to a 18.6 percent decline 
in real income taxes and a 8.7 percent decrease in the real revenue take of 
the non-PEMEX parastatals. Expenditure reductions were achieved mostly 
through huge cuts in real public sector wages and  investment spending of 
PEMEX and the federal government. While total real capital expenditures 
were cut by a thud and the real wage bill was lowered by almost a quarter, 
real  investment  spending by  the  non-PEMEX parastatal sector increased 
slightly and public sector employment rose 7.5 percent. 
Stringent monetary policy accompanied fiscal austerity. The real monetary 
base fell 12.5 percent, and real credit extended to the public sector declined 
by  15.3 percent. Although the real return on longer term deposits increased 
able  5.2  Breakdown of  the Fiscal Deficit (% of GDP) 
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5.1  5.4 
3.8  4.2 
I .3  1.2 
18.  I  13.0 
- 13.0  -1.6 
14.4  13.6 
11.7  11.0 
2.7  2.6 
9.1  9.4 
s.3  4.2 
21.4  26.8 
19.1  25.0 
2.3  1.8 
5.4  8.6 
16.1  18.2 
Sources: Figures for  1982  and  1983-86  are not  fully  comparable. For  1982, data  are from  Esfadisticar 
Hucenhrias  del  Sector  Publico:  CI@  Anuales,  1965-1982  (SHCP).  For  the parastatal  sector, current 
expenditure is calculated as operating expenditures plus ajem  de garto (outside account expenditure), and 
total revenue is the sum of current income, capital income, taxes paid, and ajenas de ingreso (outside account 
income). Data for  1983-86  are from Indicadores Economicos (Bank  of  Mexico).  Current expenditure is 
operating expenditure  plus variacion de cuentar ajenas (change in outside accounts). Total revenue is income 
(net of transfen) plus taxes paid. 
‘Preliminary figures. 
‘Includes expenditures and revenues of  DDF (Department of  the Federal District) after 1982. In 1982, DDF 
expenditures and revenues are in “other.” 
bDoes not include DDF expenditures and revenues after 1982. The “out-of-budget” deficit is treated as part 
of current expenditures. 450  Edward F.  Buffie 
able  5.3  Real Internal Energy Prices (1980 = 100) 




































































Sources: Firm input price are from the series “Combustible  y Energia”  in table 20.8, Estodisticas Hisforicos 
de Mkxico (Mexico, D.F.: INEGI, 1985).  Consumer prices are from the series “Rtroleo y Derivados”  in the 
decomposition of  the consumer price index found in lndicadores Economicos (Bank  of  Mexico). 
‘Period  average input price deflated by the GDP deflator. 
bPeriod average price deflated by the period average CPI. 
sharply, the average real interest rate paid on bank deposits remained highly 
negative. The low real returns together with uncertainty about the exchange 
rate provoked further financial disintermediation. Capital flight diminished in 
1983 but  still  totalled approximately  $8  billion;  and  while  there  was  a 
noticeable shift toward longer-term bank deposits, all measures of  financial 
intermediation exhibited large real declines (table 5.4).  Consequently, the 
private sector was subjected to a sharp reduction in credit, with real loans to 
agriculture and industry each declining by roughly 15 percent. 
With debt service claiming 50 percent of total current account income and 
over 10 percent of  national income (table 5.3,  it was necessary to delay 
trade liberalization. Stringent import controls were employed to force a 43 
percent reduction in the  volume of  total imports (table 5.6). The private 
sector bore the brunt of  the adjustment: the ratio of  private to public sector 
imports fell from  1.67 to 0.99, exceeding the previous post-World  War  I1 
low  (which occurred in  1981) by  some sixty-six percentage points.  Even 
after making allowance for the unusually high level of imports in  198  1, this 451  MexicoKhapter 5 
Table 5.4  Monetary Aggregates md Real Interest Rates 
1982  I983  1984  1985  1986 





Total stock of  bank funds' 
Total credit of the financial systemd 
Credit to the private sector' 





Total stock of bank funds 
Total credit of the financial system 
Credit to the private sector 
Average real cost of  bank funds 
Effective commercial bank loan rateh 
Real interest ratesg 
-4.3 
-  22.4 
-  10.6 
-  14.6 
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-11.6 
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-  14.6 
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Sources: The  nonpreferential  loan  rate  series  is  from  Esfodisficus de  Mixico  (Mtxico,  D.F.:  INEGI, 
1985):825. All other raw financial data are from Indicadores Economicos (Bank of Mexico). 
Nofes: M2  = Currency held by  the public  + peso- and foreign-currency-denominated checking accounts. 
M3 = M2  + liquid savings accounts. M4  = M3 + nonliquid (i.e.,  fixed-term) savings accounts. 
"Real monetary aggregates are calculated as the end-of-year balance deflated by the end-of-year CPI 
1985 the reserve requirement was lowered from 48 tu 10 percent. Simullanruusly, banks were required to 
use 38 percent of their funds to purchase various government assets (see n.  13). The figures in parentheses 
show the change in the monetary base under the assumption that the ratio of  bank reserves to M4 was the 
same in 1985 and 1986 as in  1984. 
'M4  less currency held by the public. 
dCredit of  the Central Bank, the development banks, and the commercial banks 
'Credit  extended to the private sector by the Central Bank (which is negligible), the development banks, and 
the commercial banks. 
'Average  of  the end- and beginning-of-year monetary aggregate relative to GDP. 
gEnd-of-year interest rate (December value) less the December-to-December CPI inflation rate. 
hThe nonpreferentid  loan rate. 
represents an extraordinary degree of  import compression; the cutbacks in 
1982 and 1983 brought the private sector import volume 25 percent below its 
level in  1970.' 
Contractionary fiscal and monetary policies, tight import restrictions, and 
higher real export prices produced a dramatic $1 1.6 billion turnaround in the 
current account balance. The contribution on the export side came mostly 
from manufacturing exports, whose 33 percent increase more than compen- 
sated for falling oil prices. The overall export volume rose by  16 percent and 
dollar export earnings by 5.1 percent. 
As in  so many Fund stabilization programs in Latin America, deepening 
stagflation was the price exacted for improvement in  the external accounts 452  Edward F.  Buffie 
Table 5.5  Debt Burden Measures 
1983  1984  1985  1986 
Total debt (billion $) 
Total debVGDP" 
Public sector debt service" (billion $1 
8  of  Merchandise exports 
8  of  Current account income 
% of  GDPb 
Total debt serviceC  (billion $) 
% of  Merchandise exports 
% of  Current account income 
Total debt service #2d (billion $) 
% of  Merchandise exports 
% of Current account income 
5%  of  GDPb 
% of GDP 
Net debv (billion $) 
Net debt service'(bi1lion  $) 
8  of Merchandise exports 
% of Current account income 
8  of GDPb 
Net debt service #28 (billion $) 
8  of Merchandise exports 
8  of Current account income 














































6.8  * 
97.3  98.3 
55.1  77.3 
11.1  9.6 
51.3  59.1 
36.1  39.5 
6.3  1.5 
13.0  11.1 
60.1  69.5 
42.3  45.9 
7.4  8.8 
17.5  15.0 
80.8  93.4 
56.9  61.7 
9.9  11.8 
48.2  47.0 
7.9  6.8 
36.4  42.3 
25.6  28.0 
4.5  5.3 
12.4  10.6 
57.  I  66.2 
40.2  43.8 
7.0  8.3 
Sources: Mexican Economic Outlook (CIEMEX-WHARTON) for data on the total debt and short-term public 
and private sector debt. All other data comes from fndicodores Economicos (Bank  of  Mexico). 
'Public  sector interest payments and amortization of the medium- and long-term debt. 
bGDP mcasured  in  dollars  was  calculated by  dividing nominal  GDP by  the  period  average  controlled 
exchange rate. There is no correction for deviations of the aCNd exchange rate from the equilibrium exchange 
rate. 
'Public  sector debt service plus private sector interest payments. 
dThe sum of  public and private sector interest payments, public sector amortization of  the short-, medium, 
and long-term debt, and amortization of the short-term private sector debt. Amortization of  the short-term 
debt is assumed to equal the previous period's short-term debt. 
'Calculated  as the cumulated value of  official current account deficits starting from 195 1. 
'Calculated  by scaling total interest payments by the public and private sectors by the ratio of net debt to total 
debt. No attempt is made to adjust for the fact that the interest rate on private sector foreign assets differs from 
the rates charged for foreign loans to the public and private sectors. 
Talculated as the sum of public sector amortization of the short-. medium-, and long-term  debt, amortization 
of  the  short-term private  sector  debt, and  net  interest payments. Net  interest payments  are total  interest 
payments by  the public and private sectors scaled down by  the ratio of net debt to total debt. Amortization of 
the short-term debt is assumed to equal the previous period's short-term debt. 
and  the public  sector finances (table 5.7). Notwithstanding  stiff  monetary 
and  fiscal contraction and  wage restraint  sufficient to  produce cuts  of  17 
percent  in  the  real  minimum  wage  and  21  percent  in  the  overall 
manufacturing sector wage, the inflation rate declined but slightly from 98 to 
81 percent.  While inflation remained high, real GDP declined 5.9 percent 
and aggregate underemployment increased substantially. The greatest decline 
in  economic activity occurred in  the  manufacturing sector,  where  output 
decreased 7.3 percent and employment fell 6 percent. 453  MexicoKhapter 5 
'IBble 5.6  External Accounts 
1982  1983  I984  1985  1986 
Current account (billion $) 
Capital flight (billion $) 
Merchandise exports (billion $) 
Merchandise imports (billion $) 
Volume of merchandise imports (% change) 
Mz= 




Volume of merchandise exports (% change) 
Real exchange rateb 
Real price of  total merchandise imports' 































4.2  1.2 
3.7  3.8 
24.2  21.7 
11.3  13.2 
21.5  17.1 
32.5  14.8 
34.1  28.0 
13.7  23.3 
19.6  1.8 
135.0  135.6 
127.1  132.1 
206.0  197.1 
12.8  -1.5 
-  1.3 
16.0 
11.4 
-  12.0 






Sources: Cumby and Levich (1987,  58);  and Zedillo (1987,  177). National Income Accounts (INEGI) for 
traded goods price indices and the indices of  import and export volumes. Idicadores Economicos (Bank  of 
Mexico) for the current account deficit and the dollar values of imports and exports. 
"Modified Zedillo estimate (see table 4.12). 
b1980 =  100; calculated as the period average controlled exchange rate multiplied by  the ratio of  the US. 
wholesale price index (now called tbe producer price index) to  the Mexican GDP deflator. 
'1970  = 100; deflated by the GDP deflator. For  1984-86,  spliced to CIEMEX-WHARTON series (Mexican 
Ecommic Outlook [June 1987]:181) for the internal price deflator for exports of gooh and services. 
d1970 = 100,  deflated by the GDP deflator. Fbr  1984-86,  spliced to CIEMEX series (ibid.) for internal price 
deflator for imports of goods and services. 
'I970  = 100; deflated by the GDP deflator. 
The second straight year of  severe stagflation also brought a collapse in 
aggregate investment spending, jeopardizing the future growth prospects of 
the economy. Undoubtedly, a substantial reduction in investment spending of 
the state-owned enterprises was in order, but private sector investment also 
declined to an almost equal extent (down 24.2 percent). Given the high rate 
of  inflation that  prevailed throughout  1983, it  is  improbable that demand 
contraction induced the fall in  private sector investment spending. Rather, 
the main explanatory factors appear to lie elsewhere. Financial disintermedi- 
ation and the abrupt cutoff in foreign lending led to a sharp reduction in bank 
credit: at 13.6 percent of GNP, real lending to the private sector stood at its 
lowest level since (at least) 1978. Large upward jumps in the real prices for 
capital goods and complementary inputs sharply diminished profit margins, 
reinforcing the contractionary effect of the credit squeeze.'  The real price of 
imports  rose  approximately  29  percent  while  the  increase  in  the  real 
domestic price of energy inputs was an even larger 52 percent. The high real 
import prices led to reductions of  62.2 and 31 percent, respectively, in the 
volumes of imported capital goods and intermediate inputs. 
The  large  increases  in  the  real  prices  of  domestic  and  imported 
intermediate inputs also appear to explain the puzzling coexistence of  high 454  Edward F.  Buffie 
Table 5.7a  Macroeconomic Aggregates (  % change)' 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1 9  86P 
Real GDP 
Manufacturing 






-  .5 
-2.9 
-  .6 
98.9 
-  8.5 
-  15.9 
-  17.3 
-  14.2 
-5.3  3.7 
-7.3  4.8 
2.8  2.5 
80.8  59.2 
-  6.0  2.3 
-  27.9  5.5 
-24.2  9.0 














-  12.2 
-9.8 
-  16.5 
Table 5.7b  Composition  of  Output (% of GDP)d 
Private consumption 
Government consumption 
Gross fixed capital formation 
Private 
Public 












































Sources:  The manufacturing sector employment series is from lndicadores Economicos (Bank  of Mexico). All 
other data is from the National Income Accounts (INEGI). 
PPreliminary figures. 
"Real variables are measured at 1970 prices. 
bDecember-to-December change in the CPI. 
"December-to-December  change. 
%up111  shares at 1970 prices. 
inflation  and  rising  underemployment,  on  the  one  hand,  and  strongly 
contractionary  fiscal and monetary  policy  and substantial  wage repression, 
on the  other.  The downward  pressure  exerted on  prices  by  contractionary 
demand policies and real wage repression seems to have been neutralized in 
large  measure  by  the  reduction  in  notional  supply  induced  by  higher 
intermediates  prices.  Similarly,  since decreased  usage  of  complementary 
intermediate inputs tends to lower labor's  marginal physical productivity,  a 
decline in real wages is not sufficient to guarantee a rise in employment.  In 
fact, given the magnitude of the relative price swings that occurred in 1983, 
it is quite likely that the adverse productivity effect would dominate. In the 
next chapter, I demonstrate for a wide range of plausible  technologies that 
when import quotas are tightened, even substantial real wage cuts will often 
be insufficient to prevent the emergence of open unemployment. 
5.1  1984-85:  Modest Recovery 
At  the  start of  1984, the  economy  began  to recover  from the  1982-83 
recession.  Sluggish growth in the first two quarters was followed by strong 455  MexicoIChapter 5 
growth in the last half of the year, led by a resurgence in private investment 
spending and purchases of  consumer durables. Overall GDP growth for the 
year  was  3.7 percent.  In  the  manufacturing  sector,  output increased 4.8 
percent, but employment increased only 2.3 percent despite an additional 7 
percent decrease in the real wage. 
This very  modest  “recovery”  (from deep recession to  mild  recession) 
reflected the stimulus of  a number of  reflationary demand and supply-side 
measures implemented during the  course of  the  year.  Real  public  sector 
investment declined another 10.4 percent, but real current expenditures net 
of interest payments on the foreign debt rose 5.1 percent and fiscal incentives 
were  introduced to  encourage private investment  spending. Most  impor- 
tantly,  the  favorable payments  balance recorded  in  1983  allowed  import 
controls to be greatly relaxed: imported intermediates rose by  32.5 percent 
and capital goods imports by  13.7 percent in  1984, with most of the extra 
imports going to the private ~ector.~ 
Progress on the price front coincided with recovery from the trough of the 
1982-83  recession. Although the target of a 40 percent inflation rate proved 
unattainable, the actual inflation rate fell by  twenty-one percentage points to 
59.2 percent. While wage restraint helped contain inflationary pressures, the 
most important deflationary factor at work was the expanded flow of imports 
at lower real prices. After rising nearly 30 percent the previous year, the real 
average import price fell 11.4 percent in  1984. 
The  payments  balance  also  evolved  favorably  in  1984.  Dollar  export 
earnings rose 8.4 percent, principally from a  19.6 percent increase in the 
volume  of  nonoil exports.  As  the growth in  imports took place from an 
extremely depressed level (in 1983, the aggregate [public + private] import 
volume was only 14.6 percent above its 1970 level), a $12.9 billion trade 
surplus was recorded. This translated into a current account surplus of  $4.2 
billion which was used to prepay part of the foreign debt and accumulate an 
additional $3 billion of international reserves (exceeding the target figure of 
$2 billion). Capital flight, however, remained a problem: $3.7 billion, the 
equivalent of one-third of  merchandise imports in  1984, left the country. 
The  second  consecutive  favorable  showing  in  the  payments  balance 
yielded an immediate dividend in enabling Mexico to restructure its foreign 
debt on much better terms. In the last quarter of  the year, all public sector 
debt payments maturing between 1985 and 1990 were rescheduled. Almost 
all of  the $48 billion to be paid over 1985-90  was renegotiated to mature 
over  fourteen  years.  The  interest rate  on  the  restructured  debt  was  cut 
roughly one percentage point, and LIBOR replaced the U.S.  prime rate as 
the reference rate for most of the debt. 
The adjustment program drawn up at the beginning of  the De La Madrid 
administration was formally ended early in 1985. On 24 March 1985, a new 
reform program was outlined in a Letter of  Intent to the IMF.4 This latest 
reform  package  emphasized  the  need  for  an  accelerated  pace  of  trade 456  Edward F.  Buffie 
liberalization and further reductions in the fiscal deficit. The fiscal goal was 
to lower the consolidated public  sector deficit from 6.2 percent of GDP in 
1984 to 5.1 percent in 1985. The program for trade liberalization comprised 
a variety  of measures  aimed at promoting  nonoil  exports and reducing  the 
level  and  degree  of  dispersion  in  the  structure  of  pr~tection.~  Later 
adjustments  called  for the  existing  system  of  import licenses  to be  fully 
replaced  by  the  end  of  1988  by  a  compact  schedule  of  five  tariff  rates 
ranging from zero to 30 percent (Informe Anual 1986, 1  17).6 
The reduction  in  the  fiscal  deficit  was  to be  accomplished  exclusively 
through  a reduction in expenditures;  the  share of public  sector revenues  in 
GDP was  to  be  kept  fixed  at  its  1984  level  by  offsetting  an  anticipated 
decline in  oil revenues  through  enlargement  of  the tax base and  improved 
collection procedures  (but  not  higher  tax  rates).  The intended  expenditure 
cuts were concentrated primarily in current expenditures,  but also included a 
freeze on some 100 billion pesos (equivalent to 4 percent of the 1984 deficit) 
of  nonpriority  investments.  To  curb the deficit  on financial intermediation, 
increases in the interest rates charged on preferential loans were announced 
and a ceiling of 350 billion pesos was placed on lending by the development 
banks.  Lastly,  a  number  of  administrative  reforms  were  introduced  in  an 
attempt  to  gain  better  control  over public  sector  expenditures, especially 







Monthly  and quarterly  schedules were drawn up  for SOE revenues  and 
expenditures,  and  intersecretarial  commissions  formed  to  monitor 
progress toward the deficit targets. 
Commercial  banks  (owned  by  the  government  since  1982)  have  been 
ordered not to extend credit to SOEs or other branches of the government 
without receiving prior authorization from SHCP. The banks are also to 
furnish regular reports to Hacienda detailing their credit transactions with 
the public sector. 
The Treasury is to make payments in connection with debt service of the 
SOEs directly in order to avoid diversion of  the funds earmarked for this 
purpose into other channels. 
Only net transfers among SOEs are to be carried out. This measure was 
evidently  necessary  because  certain SOEs  obtain  ‘‘unbudgeted  financ- 
ing”  by  being  less  than  scrupulous  about paying  their  bills  with  other 
SOEs. 
New disbursement procedures have been instituted so that fiscal transfers 
will not be effected until they actually become necessary. 
From the monthly allocation of  funds to programs and projects slated for 
expenditure  cuts, the  Treasury  is  to  withhold  a  sum equivalent  to  15 
percent of total fiscal transfers. 
The rather bizarre nature of these reforms is revealing.  It is not too difficult 
to discern that internal organizational problems have been, and probably still 457  MexicoKhapter 5 
are,  a severe impediment to efforts to constrain expenditure growth. Put 
more plainly, the SOEs are apparently loose  cannon^.^ 
During the course of  the year it became evident that, whatever intentions 
may  have  been,  the  fiscal  deficit  was  once  again  assuming  dangerous 
proportions. The deficit for  1984 turned  out  to  be  8.7 percent  of  GDP, 
not  6.2 percent  as stated in  the  Letter of  Intent. Moreover,  actual reve- 
nues  and  expenditures moved  further away from their  targetted levels  in 
1985, causing  the  deficit to  climb to  10 percent  of  GDP.  Declining oil 
prices lowered PEMEX’s surplus, but other factors contributed as well to 
the  growth  in  the  deficit.  While  higher  public  sector  prices  raised  the 
income  of  the  non-PEMEX  parastatals,  the  deficit  on  financial  inter- 
mediation  worsened  considerably  and  general  tax  revenues  continued  to 
stagnate (table 5.8). 
Clearly, despite avowals to the contrary, no substantive effort was made to 
enlarge the overall tax  base. Remarkably, the share of  income taxes  was 
allowed to decline 1.6 percentage points over 1981-85,  pulling down the 
share of  general tax revenues by  an almost equal amount. Only part of this 
decline can be attributed to the depressed level of  corporate profits; since 
1982, the lower yield from personal income taxes accounts for nearly all of 
the reduction in the income tax share.8 
To  a substantial extent, these large fiscal deficits reflect an inflated level 
of  current  expenditures  associated  with  the  inflationary  component  of 
interest payments on the internal debt. Table 5.9 shows two calculations of 
the  inflation-adjusted  deficit  (IAD)  obtained  using  the  Central  Bank’s 
estimates of  the  impact  of  inflation  on  the  value  of  peso-denominated 
internal debt (Informe Anual 1986, 185). The first estimate subtracts from 
the unadjusted monetary deficit the entire reduction in the value of the in- 
ternal peso debt caused by inflation even when the implied ex post real inter- 
est rate is negative.’  The second estimate is calculated using an inflation 
able  5.8  Public Sector Prices and Revenues’ 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
Real public sector pricesb  100.0  108.5  131.3  139.1  133.1 
Revenues of  non-PEMEX parastataW  7.9  8.1  7.8  8.5  9.1  9.4 
General tax revenues  10.8  9.0  9.0  9.0  9.3  9.4 
Income taxes  5.8  4.9  4.2  4.2  4.2  4.3 
Personal  2.6  2.6  2.0  1.9  2.0  2.0 
Indirect taxesd  5.0  4.1  4.8  4.8  5.0  5.1 
Foreign trade  1.1  .90  .50  .50  .67  37 
Source: Indicadores Econornicos (Bank  of  Mexico). 
‘Revenues are expressed as a percentage of  GDP. 
bPeriod average price deflated by  the period average CPI. 
“Sum of  revenues (exclusive of  any transfer payments received) plus taxes paid. 
dSum of value-added taxes, taxes on production and services, taxes on  foreign trade, and “other”  taxes. Does 
not include gasoline taxes (which I classify as revenues of PEMEX). 458  Edward F.  Buffie 
Table 5.9  Estimates of the Inflation-Adjusted Deficit (IAD), 1970-86  (9% of  GDP) 




































5.04  5.64 
4.59  5.34 
11.29  11.63 
6.99  9.28 
~  .86  ~  .22 
1.04  1.38 
1.58  1.65 
2.88  2.86 
Sources:  Data for the inHationary component of interest payments on the peso-denominated  internal debt are 
from Informe Anual 1986, 185. The figures used for the unadjusted deficit are from Esfadisficas  Harendarias 
del Secfor  Publico. Cifras Anuales. 1965- 1982 (SHCP) and lndicadores Economicos (Bank  of Mexico). 
Talculated using an inHation rate consistent with a long-term real interest rate of 5 percent 
rate  consistent  with  a  value  of  5  percent  for the  long-run  real  CETES 
(government  bonds)  rate.  According  to both  estimates,  the IAD has  been 
small in recent years. lo 
It is often claimed that a low value for the IAD indicates that inflation is 
mostly inertial and additional fiscal adjustment is unnecessary. But while the 
IAD is clearly a better measure than the actual budget deficit, the latter con- 
clusions are not at all obvious. Consider the nature of the savings-investment 
constraint  in  an  open  economy  experiencing  ongoing  inflation.  In  an 
inflationary context, the proper definition of disposable income incorporates 
anticipated capital gains or losses on different  assets (see Turnovsky  1977, 
chap. 3). Thus, under the assumption of perfect foresight, the private sector 
budget constraint reads" 
(1)  C  + S=  Y  + iB -  T - ITM, 
where  C is  real  consumption,  Y  is  real  income,  B  is  the  real  value  of 
government  (peso-denominated)  debt,  i  is  the  real  interest  rate  on 
government debt, IT  is the inflation rate, M  is the real stock of high-powered 
money,  T  is  real  taxes,  and  S is  real  net  savings  (gross  savings  equal 
S  + ITM).  Equation  (1)  may be rewritten as 
(2)  C + S  = Y  + IAD - G- DS -  ITM, 
where DS is real interest payments on the public sector external debt, G is 
other real  government  expenditure,  and IAD = G  + DS  + iB  -  T. Sub- 
stituting for Y from the goods market identity gives 
(3)  S -  I  = (NX -  DS)  + IAD - ITM 
where I  and NX denote,  respectively,  private  investment  and  net  exports. 
The first term on the right side is the current account surplus. Now suppose 
the IAD is independent of  IT  and consider the tradeoffs offered by a Cruzado 
or Austral  plan  that  eliminates  the  inflation  tax.I2 Then  (3) implies  that 459  MexicoIChapter 5 
unless a reduction in the inflation tax increases real net savings one-for-one, 
either the current account balance will deteriorate or investment will decline 
(as happened in  Argentina and Brazil). With less forced savings generated 
through the  inflation tax, some other component of  savings must  rise to 
prevent a decrease in in~estment.'~  If the size of the current account surplus 
(foreign savings) is tightly constrained by the schedule for debt repayment, 
measures must be taken either to stimulate private savings or further lower 
the IAD. A zero or even negative value of the IAD does not  eliminate the 
need for fiscal adjustment. 
In the Mexican case, the impact of  the mounting fiscal deficit was felt 
most  strongly in  financial markets. To  lessen inflationary pressures, strict 
control  over  the  growth  rate  of  the  monetary  base  was  maintained.14 
Consequently, a large part of the deficit had to be financed by  the sale of 
CETES to the banking system and the public (table 5.10). Early in the year 
the  decision was made to place 250 billion pesos of  CETES  with Banca 
Multiple.  After  October,  lending  to  the  private  sector  was  frozen  and 
virtually  all  excess  bank  funds  were  diverted  to  purchases  of  various 
government-issued assets (CETES, petrobonds, etc.).  l5 
Predictably, financing the deficit in  this  fashion led to  generally rising 
interest  rates  and  a  strong  contraction in  lending  to  the  private  sector. 
Whereas the inflation rate (December to December) rose slightly from 59.2 
to 63.7 percent, the average cost of bank funds increased each month, rising 
from 47.5 percent in December  1984 to 65.7 percent in  December  1985. 
During the same period, the yield on three-month CETES jumped from 49.2 
to 74.1 percent. The increased interest rate spread between CETES and bank 
funds provoked a  new  wave of  financial disintermediation, reversing  the 
gains made in  1984. While real credit to the public sector increased  12.6 
percent in  1985, the real stock of bank funds fell 12.9 percent and real credit 
(of the entire financial system) to the private sector contracted slightly. 
The severe credit squeeze imposed on the private sector, falling oil prices, 
and  the  catastrophic  September earthquake  in  Mexico  City  pushed  the 
economy back into recession. In the second half of  1985, real GDP growth 
turned  negative as private investment  spending and  manufacturing sector 
output contracted sharply. Overall GDP growth for the year was just  2.7 
lsble 5.10  Real Internal Debt, 1979-86 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
~  ~~~ 
Total"  100.0  107.8  126.7  175.9  155.3  137.9  147.4  167.7 
%Change  -  7.8  17.5  38.8  -11.7  -11.2  6.9  13.8 
% of GDP  18.8  18.9  20.8  35.9  31.4  26.5  29.2  40.1 
Source:  Data  on  the total  internal debt  are.  from  CIEMEX-WHARTON, Mexican  Economic  Outlook,  19, 
no. 2 (1987): 188. 
'End-of-year  stock  of  debt  deflated  by  the  end-of-year  CPI.  Includes  both  pesodenominated  and 
dollar-indexed debt. 460  Edward F.  Buffie 
percent.  In  the  manufacturing sector,  output expanded  a  respectable 5.8 
percent, but employment failed to increase. 
As  the  economy slid back  into recession  in  1985, the  large payments 
surpluses of  the preceding two years gave way  to an overall deficit. Real 
import payments rose by  19.9 percent, with public sector imports declining 
9.1  percent  and  private  sector  imports  increasing  41.2  percent.16 Total 
export  earnings decreased $2.33 billion.  Falling  world  market oil prices 
accounted for much of the decline, but nonoil export earnings also decreased 
$500  million.  The  steep  decline  in  export  earnings combined  with  the 
resurgence  of  private  sector  import  demand  to  cut  the  current  account 
surplus from $4.2 billion in  1984 to $1.24 billion in  1985. Unfortunately, 
the movement toward current account balance was not matched by a similar 
movement  in  the  capital  account.  While  the  long-run  capital  account 
registered  a  small  surplus,  capital  flight removed  $3.8  billion  from  the 
country ($9.9 billion after adjusting for underinvoicing of  exports), forcing 
the  Central  Bank  to  absorb a  $2.3  billion decrease in  its  gross  reserve 
holdings. ” 
5.2  The 1986 Oil Crisis 
Four months after the devastating earthquake, the Mexican economy was 
battered by a second severe shock. The government’s economic program for 
1986 presumed that the average price for Mexican oil would drop 9 percent 
in world markets to $23 per barrel (Znfirme Anual  1986, 17). Early in  the 
year, however, prices began plummeting, and by  July Mexican crude was 
fetching only $8.45 per barrel. Prices recovered somewhat thereafter, but the 
average price for the year still came to only $1  1.82, 53 percent below the 
1985 average of $25.35 (113, 178). The dollar value of oil exports declined 
$8.5  billion,  a  loss  equivalent  to  6.7  percent  of  the  1985 GDP  (17). 
Following previous declines, this brought the country’s terms of  trade to its 
lowest level in more than thirty years (table 5.11). Adjusted for changes in 
world market interest rates, Mexico’s terms of trade had deteriorated nearly 
60 percent since 1981 and over 40 percent since 1970. 
The De  La  Madrid administration responded to the oil price  shock by 
digging its  heels in  deeper.  Essentially, the  pre-shock policy  course was 
continued, but with an extra measure of austerity. To  blunt the impact on the 
trade balance, the rate of  depreciation of  the peso was accelerated strongly, 
producing, by the year’s end, a 32 percent increase in the real exchange rate. 
A real devaluation of  this magnitude, it was conceded, would be  strongly 
stagflationary in  the  short  run.  In  view  of  the  experience  in  1982-83, 
however, the alternative of imposing tight import quotas was judged to be 
even worse (Informe Anual  1986, 22). 
Aggressive devaluation was supplemented by limited fiscal adjustment and 
extremely contractionary monetary policy. Some new  expenditure cuts and 
tax increases were introduced, but these measures fell far short of neutralizing 461  Mexico/Chapter 5 
Table 5.11  Terms of Trade Indices 
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Source: lnforme  Anual 1986. 
"Adjusted for changes in  international interest rates 
the impact of  the oil price drop, and the consolidated public sector deficit 
soared to 16.3 percent of GNP. 
As in previous years, the fiscal deficit was financed largely by  depriving 
the private sector of  credit. The real monetary base fell sharply, while the 
real internal debt rose  13.8 percent. Even though nearly all marginal bank 
credit  (77-92  percent) remained reserved for the  public  sector, the large 
increase in bond supply could not be absorbed without inducing a strong rise 
in real interest rates. The real (compounded, annual equivalent) interest rate 
paid by  three-month CETES  averaged  19.54 percent.  Bank  rates followed 
suit.  The  average cost  of  real  bank  funds was  6.3 percent,  and  the  real 
nonpreferential loan rate fluctuated between  13 and  18.2 percent (lnforme 
Anual 1986, 27). 
Renewed austerity coming on top of  the terms of  trade loss brought the 
weak 1984-85  recovery to a grinding halt: real output declined 3.8 percent, 
real  investment  12.2 percent,  and  manufacturing sector  employment 6.7 
percent, while the inflation rate jumped from 63.2 to 105.7 percent in  1986. 
Despite the introduction of  quarterly wage adjustments, the real (minimum) 
wage fell (8.4 percent) for the fifth consecutive year. The sole consolation 
was  an  unexpected  improvement in  the  overall  payments  balance.  High 
domestic interest rates elicited a substantial capital inflow  which,  together 
with a two percentage point fall in the interest rate applicable to the foreign 
debt (lnforme Anual 1986, 25) (keeping the current account deficit to $1.3 
billion), enabled Central Bank reserves to rise by $950 million. 
In  an attempt to  head off  the growing crisis,  a standby agreement was 
signed with the IMF and a large-scale restructuring of the debt negotiated in 
the last half of the year. This latest debt package provided $12 billion of new 
funds for  1987 and  1988 and restructured the  old debt on very  favorable 462  Edward F.  Buffie 
terms for Mexico. Capital payments coming due between  1985 and  1990 in 
the amount of  $51.2  billion  have been  rescheduled  to  mature over twenty 
years  with  a seven-year grace period.  Interest  charges have been  lowered 
substantially through a reduction in the LIBOR spread from 121 to 80 basis 
points and the replacement of the U.S. prime rate by  LIBOR or an average 
of three-month CD rates quoted in various countries." 
5.3  Post-1982 Economic Policy: An Evaluation 
Judged  against  almost  any  set  of  economic, criterion,  the  post-1982 
adjustment record has been a dismal failure. At the end of  1986, real output 
stood slightly below  its 1982 level and the inflation rate had accelerated to 
over 100 percent. In per capita terms, real income fell 11 percent during this 
four-year period, with labor bearing the brunt of the decline: since 1982, real 
wages  have  decreased  approximately  30  percent  (32  percent  for  the 
minimum wage), falling far below the levels that prevailed at the end of the 
Stabilizing  Development  (table  5.12).  l9  Nor do the prospects  for recovery 
look  particularly  promising.  Both  private  and  public  sector  investment 
remain  heavily depressed,  and  while  large  current  account  surpluses were 
achieved in 1983 and 1984, by early 1986 balance of payments problems had 
emerged once again. 
Adverse external shocks and the burden of servicing the debt made some 
deterioration  in  the  economy's  performance  inevitable.  Over  1983- 86, 
Mexico's terms of trade (adjusted for changes in world market interest rates) 
declined  42.2  percent,  the  most  severe  blow  coming  in  1986 with  the 
collapse of world market oil prices. The worsening  terms of  trade coupled 
with debt service claiming 40-50  percent  of  total current account  income 
forced  an  extraordinary  degree  of  import  compression  upon  the  private 
sector.*'  Contrary to textbook models, import compression is almost certain 
to bc strongly stagflationary. Thc reason for this is simply that in Mexico, as 
in  most  LDCs, intermediate  inputs  and capital  goods account for over 80 
percent of total imports. On the normal assumption that factors of production 
are gross complements,  a reduction  in imports, whether  imposed  directly 
by  import  controls  or  induced  by  a  real  devaluation,  exerts a  powerful 
contractionary effect upon economic activity. Cutbacks in imported interme- 
diates lower labor demand at a given real wage and discourage investment by 
reducing the productivity  of  capital.  Restrictions on capital goods imports 
further depress investment by raising the supply price of capital. Since most 
imported machinery  lacks close domestic substitutes, there is little, if  any, 
demand stimulus created by expenditure switching; instead, the construction 
sector goes into a slump as investment orders fall off sharply. 
Figure 5.1 shows how the private sector import volume evolved from 1970 
to 1986. Clearly, import compression went far beyond simply offsetting the 
rapid growth  of  the oil boom  years.  Between  1981 and  1983, real private 463  MexicoIChapter  5 
Table 5.12  Real Wages (1970 = 100)” 
Manufacturing Sector 
















































































Sources:  Minimum wage data are from INEGI. The blue-collar and overall wage series for the manufacturing 
sector are from Encuesta Industrial Mensual,  as reported in Indices de Precios (February 1986). 
“Period average wage index deflated by the period average CPI. 
%e  minimum wage index is a weighted average of minimum wages in different regions, where the weights 
are given by the region’s share in the total salaried population of the nation. In years in which there was more 
than one wage adjustment, the period average figure is generated by weighting the wage in each subperiod by 
the fraction of the year during which it prevailed. 
‘Composite index for manufacturing sector wages and salaries inclusive of fringe benefits. 
sector imports were cut 73 percent; even after two years of  “recovery,”  the 
import volume in  1985 barely exceeded its  1978 level. 
But while the terms of  trade shock and the burden of debt service made 
some contraction inevitable, errant policy must also shoulder a good portion 
of  the blame for the post-1982  debacle. The excessive use of  quantitative 
restrictions to regulate the current account caused import compression to be 
deeper and more prolonged than necessary. In view of  the complementary 
nature of domestic factors and imports, policy should have been directed far 
more  toward  promoting  manufacturing and  agricultural exports  so  as  to 
minimize the impact of  debt service on import flows. Although some export 
promotion  measures  were  introduced,  others  were  withdrawn  and  nonoil 
exporters remain handicapped by  controls aimed at ensuring  “sufficient” 
supply for the domestic market. The CEDIS scheme of  subsidies has been 
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Fig. 5.1 
Sources: Indicadores Economicos (Bank of  Mexico) for dollar import values and the National 
Income Accounts (INEGI) for the aggregate import volume. 
Nore:  The private sector import volume is estimated as the aggregate import volume multiplied 
by the ratio of the dollar value of private sector merchandise imports to the dollar value of total 
merchandise imports. The 1986 aggregate import volume is estimated by  deflating the dollar 
value of  total  merchandise imports  by the dollar price  index for imports (the index given in 
Informe Anual  I985  [201], updated to 1986 using the change in import prices in Indicadores 
Economicos [April  19871)  and then  splicing  to  the National Income  Accounts  index  for the 
aggregate import volume. 
The private sector import volume, 1970-86 
Export controls have been loosened somewhat, but at the end of  1985 44.1 
percent of nonoil exports were still subject to (domestic) quotas and nominal 
protection of the agricultural sector was negative (World Bank 1986, 12- 13). 
Fiscal and interest rate policy intensified the contractionary blow delivered 
against the private sector by import compression. The fiscal deficit diminished 
but  remained  large  and  was  financed  in  good  measure  by  imposing  high 
marginal reserve requirements on the banking system. In addition, the deficit 
drove bond rates  strongly upward  which,  together with the failure to raise 
deposit rates to positive levels, provoked a sharp decrease in the supply of 
bank funds. Financial disintermediation  and the redirection of  credit toward 
the public sector have depressed bank loans to the private sector to historically 465  Mexico/Chapter 6 
low levels: total real credit to the private sector was 11.7 percent lower in 
1986 than in  1978, and the share of M4 in GDP was at its lowest level since 
1965. Finally, private investment was further depressed by  the manner in 
which fiscal cuts were achieved. No doubt a substantial reduction in parastatal 
investment spending was necessary, but investment expenditures for infra- 
structure capital were also severely slashed. As  many types of infrastructure 
capital enhance the productivity of private sector capital, the latter cutbacks, 
like import compression  and  the  reduction  in  bank  lending, lowered the 
profitability of private investment. 
Once  investment  declines,  it  is  easy  for  the  economy  to  slip  into  a 
downward spiral in which capital decumulation, rising inflation, and growing 
fiscal deficits become mutually reinforcing. As  lower investment rates take 
their toll on the capital stock, output declines and inflation accelerates. For a 
given level of real government expenditures, the decline in real output widens 
the fiscal deficit by lowering real tax revenues. If the larger deficit is financed 
by  printing money, inflation rises further (the budget is “balanced”  by  the 
inflation tax), triggering a new round of financial disintermediation and capital 
decumulation.  If  an  attempt is made to  contain  inflationary pressures by 
covering the revenue shortfall through greater bond sales, the bond rate jumps 
upward and again the outcome is further financial disintermediation, capital 
decumulation, and intensified inflationary pressures. 
In the next two chapters, formal theoretical models are developed in an 
attempt to gain a fuller understanding of the factors that seem to be driving 
the Mexican economy into a low growth, low real wage, high inflation, high 
underemployment equilibrium. In chapter 6 I analyze the repercussions of 
import compression on real wages and underemployment, while chapter 7 is 
an investigation of  the links between capital accumulation, inflation, fiscal 
deficits, and financial disintermediation. 
6  Import Compression, Real 
Wages, and Underemployment 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of  the post-1982 adjustment process has 
been  the  imposition  of  an  extreme and  unprecedented  degree of  import 
compression upon the private sector. Highly restrictive quotas were placed 
on imports of  all types between 1982 and 1984 as part of a comprehensive 
stabilization program  aimed  first and  foremost  at  eliminating the  current 
account deficit. On 25 July 1985, a large number of quotas were eliminated, 
but, until very recently, import controls (licenses, high “reference”  prices 